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Abstract—GAN (Generative Adversarial Networks, [1]) is a
deep-learning based generative approach to generate contents
such as images, languages and speeches. Recently, studies have
shown that GAN can also be applied to generative adversarial
attack examples ([2], [3]) to fool the machine-learning models. In
comparison with the previous non-learning adversarial example
attack approaches, the GAN-based adversarial attack example
approach can generate the adversarial samples quickly using the
GAN architecture every time facing a new sample after training,
but meanwhile needs to perturb the attack samples in great
quantities, which results in the unpractical application in reality.
To address this issue, we propose a new approach, named Few-
Feature-Attack-GAN (FFA-GAN). FFA-GAN has a significant
time-consuming advantage than the non-learning adversarial
samples approaches and a better non-zero-features performance
than the GAN-based adversarial sample approaches. FFA-GAN
can automatically generate the attack samples in the black-box
attack through the GAN architecture instead of the evolutional
algorithms or the other non-learning approaches. Besides, we
introduce the mask mechanism into the generator network of
the GAN architecture to optimize the constraint issue, which
can also be regarded as the sparsity problem of the important
features. During the training, the different weights of losses of
the generator are set in the different training phases to ensure
the divergence of the two above mentioned parallel networks
of the generator. Experiments are made respectively on the
structured data sets KDD-Cup 1999 and CIC-IDS 2017, in which
the dimensions of the data are relatively low, and also on the
unstructured data sets MNIST and CIFAR-10 with the data of
the relatively high dimensions. The results of the experiments
demonstrate the effectiveness and the robustness of our proposed
approach.
I. I. INTRODUCTION
GAN (Generative Adversarial Networks, [1]) is an unsuper-
vised learning method and a deep model architecture which
consists of a generative model and a discriminative model.
The principle of GAN is to build a zero-sum game through
the competition of two neural networks and then two networks
compete each other to reach Nash equilibrium to learn to
create the complex distribution of the instance. Recently, GAN
is more and more widely used in many domains, not only
limitedly in the fields of the generation of images ([1], [4], [5]),
speeches [6] and languages [7] , but also in the other fields like
adversarial examples ([2], [3]) and malware generation [8].
This paper is going to discuss the application of an improved
GAN method to generate attack adversarial examples to attack
the machine-learning based models, especially concerning
about the issue of reducing the perturbation when producing
the attack adversarial examples using the GAN architecture.
Adversarial example is a sample example which has been
modified additionally, and its goal is to make the machine
learning models to misclassify it. There are previously many
studies in the field of generative attack example. [9] explained
the concept of adversarial examples. It refers to an input
sample formed by deliberately adding subtle perturbation in
the data set, which causes the model to give a false prediction
with high confidence. [10] proposed fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) that can produce the subtle perturbation, and it is
a white-box attack method. JSMA[11]is also a white-box
attack method, which calculates L2 and L∞ to build the
saliency map to limit the perturbation in a small range. [12]
proposed a black-box attack approach which can use only very
few pixels to implement the adversarial sample attack using
the evolutional algorithm. The drawback of the optimization-
based approaches is that these approaches are not the learning
methods so that we have to consume too much time to
calculate the perturbation for the attack sample when facing a
new attack sample.
For the learning approach, GAN is a well-behaved alterna-
tive in the adversarial sample because of its good generative
ability. [2] proposed a method (AdvGAN) to generate adver-
sarial examples through GAN. They implemented both of the
white-box and the black-box attack method, the method only
was used in image processing. [3] proposed IDSGAN that
can generate adversarial attacks and they generated adversarial
malicious traffic for the IDS (Instrusion Detection System)
data set through a black attack approach, but they completely
replaced almost all features. These two approaches both re-
quire lots of features being changed when attacking.
In this paper, we propose a new improved GAN architecture
named Few-Feature-Attack-GAN (FFA-GAN) to implement
the adversarial attack to produce perturbations which are
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Fig. 1. FFA-GAN
added in the attack instance to fool machine learning classifier
models. Instead of using the great mass of features of the
original attack instance, only few features of the original attack
instance need to be changed because of the introduction of the
mask mechanism in the generator network. The generator is
composed of two parallel networks, the mask network and
the perturbation network. The mask network defines which
features of the changeable features on the instance can be
perturbed during the training, and the perturbation network
provides the perturbation of the all changeable features on the
instance. Through the matrix dot production of two outputs
from the mask network and the perturbation network, we can
get the generator output as the perturbation (padding is needed
if the dimensions of generator output are smaller than the
all dimensions of the sample). The losses of the generator
are composed of different parts, including the classification
loss, the perturbation loss and the mask loss and the loss
of the discriminator is the classification loss for the instance.
With the help of the GAN framework, the generator and the
discriminator build a zero-sum game to compete with each
other, and reach an equilibrium to get the final perturbation
with the few changed featured and the high bypass rate at the
end.
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Fig. 2. Visualization of the Perturbation
To train the parallel networks, the several weight pairs for
the losses should be adaptively changed so that the training can
converge. At the beginning of the training, we set the weight
of the classification loss large and the weight of the mask loss
small. As the training goes, the weight of the classification
decreases gradually and the weight of the mask loss decreases.
We can regard the two phases as ”the exploration phase”
and ”the exploitation phase” respectively. That means we first
explore a good result in a relatively wide range and then
optimize the range as small as possible to exploit a better
result.
Our main contributions of the proposed FFA-GAN approach
can be concluded as follows:
(1)In FFA-GAN, we introduce the mask mechanism into the
generator network. The mask mechanism provides a filter to
reduce the number of changed features or the perturbation of
the samples and meanwhile without reducing the bypass rate
through the GAN architecture.
(2)We define the losses of the generator in GAN which are
composed of three parts: the classification loss, the loss of
magnitude of perturbations, and the loss of non-zero-features’
length of perturbations in the mask network.
(3)During the training, we use a specific training strategy
to change the weights of different losses adaptively, and
ensure the convergence of FFA-GAN and achieve a better
performance than the method with the fixed loss weights.
II. II. PRELIMINARY
We define generating adversarial attack samples to a target
machine-learning model as a constraint optimization problem.
The task of an adversarial attack sample is to modify the origi-
nal attack sample as little as possible to make the target model
misclassify it as the normal one. Based on these, we assume
a target machine-learning classifier model L, the sample can
be expressed as a vector of scalar features X = {x1, x2, ...}.
The perturbation of the adversarial sample can be represented
as p(X) = {x′1, x′2, ...}, which will be added in the original
sample as the new sample.
X ′ = X + p(X) = {x1 + x′1, x2 + x′2, ...} (1)
The model L can classify the sample if it is malicious or
not or whether it is the target class. We use f(X) to express
the ability of the model to classify the attack sample as the
attack sample. To describe the ability of the adversarial ability,
we here define the goal function as the bypass rate as follows:
ratebypass = max(1− f(X ′)/f(X), 0) (2)
The goal of generating adversarial attack is to maximize the
high bypass rate:
maximize :
p(X)
ratebypass (3)
While maintaining the high bypass rate, the difference of
the adversarial attack sample and the original attack sample
should be as little as possible. Therefore the constraints of the
task can be describe as the following form:
subject to:
length(p(X)) < 1
abs(p(X)) < 2
(4)
In the domain of the adversarial examples, untargeted attack
is an attack that fools the model to predict the sample as the
type which is not the designated. Here y is the attack class
label.
f(X ′) 6= y (5)
Correspondingly, the goal of the targeted attack is to predict
the sample as the target type. Here t is the target class label.
f(X ′) = t (6)
Black-box attack is an attack that the attacker does not know
the details of the inner information of the target model, such
as the parameters, the structures and so on. On the contrary,
the every details of the target model are known to the attacker
in the white-box attack. We discuss in this paper only the
black-box attack. White-box attacks are not considered in our
scenario.
III. III. METHODOLOGY
To produce the adversarial samples using the GAN architec-
ture, we adopt the approach which is similar to ADV-GAN [2].
Based on the data set, we first train several machine-learning-
based classifiers as the target models or black-box classifiers
using the ground truth labels from the data set. The classifiers
can be deep models or other non-deep models like random
forest, decision tree and so on. Then a GAN-based architecture
is build, in which the generator’s input is the malicious samples
or the samples that are to disguise, and the discriminator is
fed with the malicious samples added with from the generator
produced perturbations, and the task of the discriminator is to
distinguish it whether the samples are malicious or not or the
target type or not.
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Fig. 3. GAN Framework
The noise can also be the part of the input of the generator to
exploit better results. In our scenario, we do not use the noise
in the input of the generator because the results can be more
stable and reproduceable without adding the noise. The output
of the generator network is the perturbation, whose feature
dimensions can be different with the feature dimensions of
the sample. If so, padding zeros of the output of the generator
to the same dimension as the original sample is needed. The
produced perturbations are added on the original samples and
the elements of the adversarial samples should be limited
in the valid range and then fed into the black-box classifier
with the normal samples. The predictions of the black-box
classifier for the samples are regarded as the labels for the
discriminator, which can be trained according to these labels
to get closer and closer to the black-box classifier. The above
mentioned procedure is done recursively many times through
the GAN architecture until this min-max game finally comes
to a equilibrium, which means producing the perturbation
that can disguise the original sample and fool the black-box
classifier.
min
G
max
D
V (D,G) = Ex∼pdata(x)[logD(x)]
+Ez∼pz(z)[log(1−D(G(z)))]
(7)
Mask Net
Perturb Net
X
Original Instance New Instance
𝐿𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑘
𝐿𝑐𝑙𝑠 + 𝐿𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑏
Fig. 4. Generator Network
Based on the basic GAN Formular 7, there are also ex-
tra constraints for the perturbation, the amplitude and the
length of the perturbations, which are length(p(X)) < 1,
abs(p(X)) < 2 as above mentioned. To address this con-
straint problem, we design a new neural network for the
generator which is composed of two parallel parts: the mask
network and the perturbation network. The input of generator
is a feature vector, which is put into several neural layers to
get latent variable z of the original sample, and then the latent
variable z is fed into the mask network and the perturbation
network respectively, and then through the dot production of
two vectors of outputs of two parallel networks, we get the
perturbation of the original sample. The sample is then added
on the original sample to get the final attack sample.
The task of the mask network is to select the features
of the perturbation that matter to the classifier. Unlike the
traditional binary mask mechanism, we confine the output of
mask network in the range [0,+∞) using ReLU non-linear
module instead of the binary feature as in this way the gradient
can be backpropagated through the mask network to the front
neural layers to train the mask network. There is no labels
for the mask network like in computer vision [13], therefore
we train the mask network through the predefined the mask
sparsity losses. The unimportant features of perturbations can
be presented by zeros in the output. The output of perturb
network is multiplied with the output of the mask network to
produce the perturbation. And the mask network’s parameters
are updated by the GAN structure.
The generator losses are defined as follows:
Lgenerator = Lclf + Lperturb + Lmask (8)
where different losses demonstrate different meanings:
Lclf = cel(f(X), f(X
′)) (9)
Lperturb = mean(abs(p(X))) = L1 (10)
Lmask = sum(abs(sign(p(X)))) = L0 (11)
Here Lclf is the cross entropy loss of classification, Lperturb
is the loss of the amplitude of perturbations, the L1 regular-
izer, Lmask represents the loss of no-zero-features’ length of
perturbations the L0 regularizer.
Fig. 5. Dot production of two outputs of two nets
Because of the two parallel networks in the generator
network, it is hard to train FFA-GAN networks. This parallel
structure brings the unstabilization during the training. So
FFA-GAN needs a specific training method. First of all, the
loss of Lmask should be set a small value, so that the GAN
can easily find the perturbation in a very wide range. Then, we
increase the weight of Lmask gradually to reduce the length
of the changed feature number. Finally, we set a stop training
condition, which is over a threshold bypass rate and meanwhile
maintains the changed features of all features smaller than , a
predefined small value. The principle is that we first explore a
good result in a relatively wide range, which means the great
number of the changed features is tolerant in the early training
phase. Then the range of the changed features is optimized
as small as possible to exploit a better result. These two
phases can be regarded as ”the exploration phase” and ”the
exploitation phase” respectively.
IV. IV. EXPERIMENT
To test the performance of the proposed FFA-GAN ap-
proach, four experiments are made on the structured and
unstructured data sets.
A. Structured Data Set
1) i. KDD-Cup 1999: KDD-Cup 1999 [14] is a data
set used for a big data analysis competition on the Fifth
International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data
Mining in 1999. The data were collected by MIT Lincoln
Labs for the 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation
Program. The Intrusion Detection System is a tool in the
network system, which can surveille and analyse the status
of the network system to detect and evaluate the possible and
potential attack samples. Each data sample on KDD-Cup 1999
contains 41 features extracted from nine weeks’ attacks and
the normal traffic of the raw TCP dump data for a local-
area network (LAN) built by DARPA, of which 9 features
are symbolic and 32 features are continuous. The attack
samples are composed of four categories: DOS (denial-of-
service), R2L (unauthorized access from a remote machine),
U2R (unauthorized access to local superuser privileges) and
Probing (surveillance and other probing).
Fig. 6. Training curves of FFA-GAN for the classifiers on KDD-Cup 1999
The experiments of FFA-GAN on the data set KDD-Cup
1999 are made as follows: First of all, we preprocess the raw
data by scaling the features in the range [0,1]. And then we
randomly split the data set into two parts: 4/5 and 1/5 of all
data as the training data and the testing data respectively.
Based on these, four classifiers are trained to classify the
data using different algorithms as the target black-box models,
which are Decision Tree([15]), Logic Regression([16]), Multi-
Layer Perception([17]) and XGBOOST([18]).
The 32 continuous features are chosen for the output of
the perturbation of the generator in the FFA-GAN, which are
more changeable and meaningful than the other 9 symbolic
features in the reality. As the dimensions of the output of
the generator are smaller than the dimensions of the original
sample, padding zeros is needed. Figure 6 shows the training
curves for the xgboost classifier. We set different weights in
the epoch of 5000, 7500, 10000, 15000 and 20000 to train
the FFA-GAN. The targeted attack for the normal label makes
sense in this scenario because in reality, the attack samples
are what we want to disguise as the normal samples to fool
the classifier.
It is obvious that in Figure 6 the number of changed features
decreases, meanwhile the accuracy of the four classifiers falls
from over 99% to less than 10%. The first graph shows very
clear that in each predefined epoch (5000, 7500, 10000, 15000
and 20000), there are a significant change of the number of
changed features. The score curves gradually decrease and stay
stabile no matter the weights change, which demonstrates the
stabile results of the training procedure at the end.
TABLE I
FFA-GAN AND IDS-GAN TARGETED ATTACK RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT
CLASSIFIERS ON KDD-CUP 1999
Classifier acc FFA-GAN IDS-GANacc* len acc* len
dt 99.9% 8.1% 1.6 0.4%
20.5lr 94.2% 6.0% 1.7 0.6%mlp 99.9% 3.0% 2.2 0.7%
xgboost 99.6% 10.3% 3.2 -%
(”acc*” means the classifier’s accuracy after the adversarial attack. ”len”
means the length of non-zero features of the perturbation. The attack IDS-
GAN contains no ”Probing”.)
The total results of the FFA-GAN on KDD-Cup 1999 for the
four classifiers can be concluded as shown in the Table I. From
the table, we can see a enormous accuracy rate fall after using
FFA-GAN and only very few features need to be changed.
For the approach IDS-GAN [3], the average changed number
is over 20 features, ca. 45% of all features. In contrast, we use
only 2-3 features (less than 7.5% of all features) to achieve a
high bypass rate as in IDS-GAN.
2) ii. CIC-IDS 2017: Like KDD-Cup 1999, CIC-IDS 2017
[19] is also a data set about the intrusion detection system.
The difference lies in that CIC-IDS 2017 is a relatively new
data set and contains totally 78 features and 8 attack types for
each sample. Excluding the discrete features, we implement
FFA-GAN only on the continuous features. From the Table
II, we can see the better results on the CIC-IDS 2017 than
on KDD-Cup 1999. We can also see a enormous accuracy
fallen after using FFA-GAN and only very few features need
to be changed and meanwhile FFA-GAN achieves a very high
bypass rate. This is also a proof that FFA-GAN generalizes
on different data set with the low dimensional structured data.
B. Unstructured Data Set
1) i. MNIST: MNIST data set [20] is a classic data set in
the domain of image processing. The images were collected
by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and
contains 60,000 training images and 10,000 testing 28 pixels
* 28 pixels images, which are composed of 10 arabic number.
The target classifiers are vgg16 [21] and resnet34 [22]. Both
TABLE II
FFA-GAN TARGETED ATTACK RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT CLASSIFIERS ON
CIC-IDS 2017
Classifier acc acc* len
dt 99.0% 4.0% 3.2
lr 91.3% 0.1% 2.1
mlp 99.1% 0.5% 2.3
xgboost 99.6% 0.1% 2.2
(”acc*” means the classifier’s accuracy after the FFA-GAN attack. ”len”
means the length of non-zero features of the perturbation.)
have the classification accuracy over 99.0% on MNIST data
set. As the untargeted attack is easier than the targeted target,
we only implement FFA-GAN to attack the classifiers in
the targeted way to test the FFA-GAN approach. Table III
shows the different approaches’ results of FFA-GAN based on
the different target classifier. The final average perturbations’
length of FFA-GAN is smaller than 3% of all pixels and ca.
99.5% samples can be classified incorrectly as the predefined
target type. In contrast, the ADV-GAN needs to change a great
lot of features to achieve the high bypass rate, for the one pixel
attack approach we need to use 30 pixels attack to achieve
ca. 83% bypass rate based on the vgg16-classifier. Figure 7
demonstrates the attack examples on MNIST using FFA-GAN.
TABLE III
FFA-GAN, ADV-GAN AND ONE PIXEL ATTACK TESTING RESULTS ON
MNIST
Classifier acc FFA-GAN ADV-GAN OP Attackacc* len acc* len acc* len
vgg16-
targeted
99.5% 0.3% 25.6 0.1% 525.6 16.0% 30
resnet34-
targeted
99.3% 0.5% 24.4 0.2% 530.1 -% -
(”acc*” means the classifier’s accuracy after the adversarial attack. ”len”
means the length of non-zero features of the perturbation.)
2) ii. CIFAR-10: CIFAR-10 data set [23] is an image data
set, which were collected by Alex Krizhevsky, Vinod Nair, and
Geoffrey Hinton. There are totally 60000 images in 10 classes,
with 6000 32 pixels x 32 pixels colour images per class. The
data set is composed of five training batches and one test batch,
each with 10000 images. The difference between the CIFAR-
10 data set and the MNIST data set is their channels: the
image of CIFAR-10 has 3 channels and the image of MNIST
has only one channel, which means it is more difficult to train
FFA-GAN on the data set CIFAR-10 than on MNIST. Like
the other experiments, the classifiers for the data set are firstly
trained. Here we also use vgg16 and resnet34, which both have
over 93% classification accuracy on CIFAR-10. After using the
FFA-GAN approach, the accuracy rate of vgg16 and resnet34
has fallen to the 40% and 30% respectively, meanwhile only
ca. 4.5% of all pixels are perturbed. ADV-GAN [2] uses over
50% of all pixels to achieve a high bypass rate. One pixel
attack approach [12] needs to use 30-pixels attack to reduce
the accuracy of the sample to 17.1% averagely. Figure 8 are
Fig. 7. Attack Examples in MNIST
(The upper images are the original samples. The bottom images are the
FFA-GAN adversarial samples which are all classified as the target arabic
number 5 based on the target resnet34-classifier.)
the successful attack examples of FFA-GAN.
TABLE IV
FFA-GAN, ADV-GAN AND ONE PIXEL ATTACK TESTING RESULTS ON
CIFAR-10
Classifier acc FFA-GAN ADV-GAN OP Attackacc* len acc* len acc* len
vgg16-
targeted
93.2% 53.1% 48.0 14.3% 551.3 17.1% 30
resnet34-
targeted
94.2% 60.2% 51.4 13.2% 547.7 -% -
(”acc*” means the classifier’s accuracy after the adversarial attack. ”len”
means the length of non-zero features of the perturbation.)
C. Summary
From the four experiments, we can draw the conclusion
that FFA-GAN is an effective and robust approach to generate
the adversarial samples on the structural and unstructural data
set. In comparison with the GAN-based approaches IDS-GAN
[3] and ADV-GAN [2], FFA-GAN can obviously reduce the
length of the needed perturbations and meanwhile keep a very
Fig. 8. Attack Examples in CIFAR-10
(In every frame, the left image is the original sample, the right image is the
FFA-GAN adversarial sample, the bottom image is the perturbation. The
above examples are all classified as the target type TRUCK based on the
target vgg16-classifier.)
TABLE V
ONE PIXEL ATTACK AND FFA-GAN RESULTS FOR TESTING 100 IMAGES
ON MNIST
OP Attack FFA-GAN
iteration acc-
1
acc-
5
acc-
10
acc-
20
acc-
30
T(s) acc T(s)
75-
vgg16
100% 91% 88% 64% 55% 466
0.1% 0.1
150-
vgg16
99% 84% 77% 55% 43% 896
300-
vgg16
97% 84% 60% 39% 30% 2532
75-
resnet34
96% 48% 36% 22% 15% 305
0.2% 0.1
150-
resnet34
95% 24% 18% 11% 5% 615
300-
resnet34
98% 16% 4% 2% 2% 1078
(”x-model” for OP Attack means the execution optimization iteration time
based on the target model. ”acc-x” for OP Attack means the classifier’s
accuracy after the x-pixels attack. Time is calculated per one image. The
experiments are made on the computer with Win10, Memory 64GB, GPU
2080 and CPU i7-8700k.)
high bypass rate as shown in Table I, II, III, IV. In comparison
with the traditional non-learning approaches One-pixel-attack
[12], FFA-GAN can generate the adversarial samples using
only once forward computing for the FFA-GAN after training.
However, the other non-learning approaches need to use the
classifier many times until the successful adversarial samples
are found. For instance, one pixel attack approach spends
much more time using the target classifier per samples to get
the final results on MNIST as shown in Table V. Besides, the
bypass rate FFA-GAN is better than One-pixel-attack. In the
term of the sparsity, FFA-GAN’s result is relatively worse than
one-pixel attack in CIFAR-10. The reason might be that the
mask, which decides the sparsity of the perturbation, is trained
by the neural network and it is hard to train the L0 regularizer
as it is an NP-problem. Therefore, the hyperparameters of
the losses’ weights, which are manually predefined, play an
important role in FFA-GAN.
V. V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a Few-Feature-Attack GAN
approach to generate adversarial examples to fool machine-
learning models. FFA-GAN has a significant time-consuming
advantage than the non-learning adversarial samples ap-
proaches and a better non-zero-features performance than
the GAN-based adversarial sample approaches. Through the
introduction of the mask mechanism, the number of changed
features of the perturbation is constraint as few as possible.
And we define three losses of the generator network based
on the GAN architecture and change the weights of the
losses during the training to find a better result in a wide
range firstly and minimize the range later. Experiments on the
structured data sets and unstructured data sets results show the
good performance of the FFA-GAN approach. For the future
work, the change of the weights of the losses during training
can be optimised using the optimization algorithms such as
Population based Training method [24]. PBT can parallelly
train GANs as a population in large scale and optimise
the hyperparamers of the different losses through evolution
algorithms. Besides, the work on exploiting the performance
of FFA-GAN in the image with high resolutions is also worth
to be studied in the future.
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